Every time you see the padlock in your browser, maths is protecting you. Some of that maths — the public-key methods known as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography — could be broken by a large enough quantum computer. Nobody knows exactly when such a machine will exist, but 2026 was the year the deadlines for replacing today's methods became firm.
Why it matters now, before quantum computers arrive
Attackers can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it later, once quantum computers are powerful enough ("harvest now, decrypt later"). And replacing encryption across every system, device and supplier takes years. That is why governments and tech companies want the work done well before the threat arrives.
The replacements are post-quantum cryptography (PQC): new algorithms, standardised by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), that are designed to resist quantum attacks while running on ordinary computers.
The 2026 milestones
March — Google sets 2029. Google announced it was bringing its migration target forward to 2029, citing progress in quantum hardware, error correction and estimates of the resources needed to break encryption. It now prioritises authentication, and said Android 17 is integrating post-quantum digital signatures (ML-DSA). As Google's Heather Adkins and Sophie Schmieg wrote, "it's our responsibility to lead by example and share an ambitious timeline."
April — Cloudflare targets 2029 too. Cloudflare said it aims "to be fully post-quantum (PQ) secure including, crucially, post-quantum authentication" by 2029, and that over 65% of human traffic to Cloudflare is already post-quantum encrypted. Its reasoning: if quantum attacks arrived suddenly, "data leaks are severe, but broken authentication is catastrophic."
October — the UK NCSC updates its TLS guidance. The NCSC now recommends both hybrid (post-quantum combined with traditional) and pure post-quantum key agreement for TLS, and notes that TLS 1.3 is the only version that supports PQC — earlier versions will not be upgraded. Advice on post-quantum authentication for TLS is to follow.
October — NIST sets the end dates. NIST's final report IR 8547, published on 27 October 2026, states: "NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow its use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035." RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, Diffie-Hellman and ECDH are all listed as deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default parameter set for post-quantum key establishment.
The UK timeline
The NCSC's migration roadmap, published in March 2025 and still current, sets three stages:
- By 2028: identify which cryptographic services need upgrading and build a migration plan.
- 2028 to 2031: carry out the highest-priority upgrades.
- 2031 to 2035: complete migration for all systems, services and products.
In a July 2026 workshop report with industry, the NCSC stressed that the first steps — discovery, prioritisation and roadmap development — should be happening now.
What it means for you
At home: there is nothing to buy. Keep your phone, computer, browser and router updated; post-quantum protection is already arriving through normal updates from companies like Google and Cloudflare.
If you run a small business: ask your IT provider and key software suppliers about their post-quantum plans, and plan to replace equipment that cannot be updated (old routers, VPNs and on-premises servers) before 2030.
If you work in IT or at an MSP:
- Build a cryptographic inventory: where RSA and elliptic-curve keys are used, in certificates, VPNs, SSH, code signing and applications.
- Move to TLS 1.3 everywhere; it is the only route to post-quantum TLS.
- Prefer vendors with published PQC roadmaps, and add PQC questions to procurement.
- Prioritise long-lived sensitive data and systems that are hardest to change.
The bottom line
The quantum threat is uncertain in timing but certain in direction, and in 2026 the deadlines stopped being vague. For most people the change will be invisible. For organisations, the job is to know where their encryption lives and to be on TLS 1.3 and modern, updatable systems well before 2030.
This article summarises and comments on the sources listed below. It is general information, not legal or professional advice.