On 21 February 2025, staff at the cryptocurrency exchange Bybit approved what looked like a routine transfer from one of its "cold" wallets — the offline storage meant to be the safest place for funds. Minutes later, the wallet had been emptied.

Bybit said "over 400,000 ETH and stETH worth more than $1.5 billion were transferred to an unidentified address". It was, at the time, the largest crypto theft on record. (Figures vary slightly by source: BleepingComputer reported $1.46 billion, The Block about $1.4 billion.)

Who did it

On 26 February the FBI said "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of approximately $1.5 billion USD in virtual assets" from Bybit, and that it "refers to this specific North Korean malicious cyber activity as 'TraderTraitor.'" The group is often linked to the wider Lazarus cluster.

How it worked: a poisoned supplier

Bybit used Safe{Wallet}, a widely used multi-signature wallet service, to approve transfers. Investigations found:

  • a Safe{Wallet} developer machine had been compromised, according to Safe;
  • malicious JavaScript was injected into the Safe{Wallet} web interface, specifically targeting Bybit (Verichains, via BleepingComputer);
  • the code was changed two days before the attack and clean files were restored about two minutes after it, to cover the tracks (Sygnia, via BleepingComputer);
  • the result "altered the smart contract logic and masked the signing interface" — staff saw a normal transaction but approved a malicious one.

Laundering at speed

The FBI said the stolen assets were "dispersed across thousands of addresses on multiple blockchains" and expected them to be laundered and converted into ordinary currency. Within a week, more than half had been moved into bitcoin, largely through the THORChain service (The Block). By 4 March, Bybit chief executive Ben Zhou said 20% had "gone dark", 77% was still traceable and 3% had been frozen.

Bybit said it remained solvent and covered customers' losses: "Bybit is Solvent even if this hack loss is not recovered" (BleepingComputer).

Why it matters beyond crypto

Bybit's own systems were not where the attack began. A trusted supplier's software was altered to show staff something false at the moment they made a high-value decision. Any business that approves payments through a web portal faces a version of the same risk. The same group was later blamed for the even larger Binance theft in 2026.

What it means for you

At home: if you hold crypto, keep long-term savings in a hardware wallet that shows transaction details on its own screen, and check that screen — not your computer — before approving.

If you run a small business: for large payments, verify the details through a second channel (a phone call to a known number), not just the screen used to approve them.

If you work in IT or at an MSP:

  1. Treat third-party web interfaces used for approvals as part of your attack surface.
  2. Require independent verification for high-value transactions, ideally on a separate device.
  3. Protect developer machines and cloud storage keys: a single developer laptop started this chain.
  4. Monitor critical third-party scripts for unexpected changes.

The bottom line

The Bybit theft showed that "cold" storage and multiple signatures are not enough if what people see on screen can be faked. Verify high-value actions on a channel attackers do not control.

This article summarises and comments on the sources listed below. It is general information, not legal, financial or professional advice.